Multiple Personality as a Failure
Mark Brown of
Autobiographical Memory
Case studies of multiple personality
attract the attention of philosophers in part because they purport to describe
real cases of personal division, deltas in the stream of consciousness that can
be studied empirically, without trotting out yet again hemispheric brain
transplants and similar science fiction thought experiments. Daniel Dennett
locates multiple personality within a narrative theory of the self, suggesting that
in such cases the center of narrative gravity fractures, resulting in an
unstable struggle for control by rival narrative centers, rather like shifting
coalitions jockeying for power in a contentious, multiparty parliament;
Stephen Braude argues at length that a broadly Kantian transcendental unity of
apperception necessarily undergirds the public faces of multiplicity;
Jennifer Radden deploys a wide range of dissociative disorders to illuminate
self-deception, akrasia and other forms of motivated irrationality;
for Susan Hurley, multiple personality constitutes evidence for intransitive,
partial unity of consciousness;
and the centerpiece of Carol Rovane’s ambitious fusion of Kantian and Lockean
theories of personal identity is the rational reconstruction of group persons
and multiple personality disorder.
Each
of these philosophers in their own way adopts a realist interpretation of the
language of multiplicity. In this essay, I suggest an alternative
interpretation of multiple personality as a breakdown in an intricately
structured autobiographical memory system. Autobiographical memory enables most
people to juggle effortlessly an array of autobiographical memory schemata,
deploying first one than another as the occasion arises, but in some cases,
most dramatically in multiple personality, the schemata become strangely out of
joint, leading to disordered awareness within and erratic behavior without.
This interpretation of the language of multiplicity offers a more economical
description of the clinical data, avoids the reification of alters and their
activities, remains effectively neutral with respect to the underlying
philosophical issues, and is at least as plausible as the alternatives. My
argument for this conclusion falls into four stages. I first describe the
features of multiple personality that generate philosophical perplexity; next,
I survey the evidence from the cognitive sciences relevant to this kind of
failure in autobiographical memory. I then apply the results to the language of
multiplicity. I conclude with a critical look at Carol Rovane’s robustly
realist interpretation of the language of multiplicity in her recent book, The
Bounds of Agency.
I
The fictionalized bestseller Sybil
and its companion teledrama brought to the attention of thousands of troubled
people a language of multiplicity that makes sense of their lives.
In post-Sybil America, recurrent bouts of amnesia, disorientation and failed
personal relationships can lead to therapeutic recovery of memories of severe
physical, emotional and sexual abuse in early childhood. The patient comes to
understand that some people, especially children victimized by trusted
caregivers, are capable of mentally “leaving” the scene of traumatic events,
“handing off” the experience to other inner selves called “alters” who come to
have their own names, personal history and sense of self and who subsequently
vie for control of the common body. The losers retreat into the audience of the
theater of consciousness where they “listen in” and try to influence behind the
scenes the mental life of the “regnant self,” all the while awaiting their
chance to initiate a “switch,” “come out” and pursue a private and often
contrary agenda.
People diagnosed with multiple
personality exhibit two features of particular interest to the philosopher of
mind: First, they display substantially less psychological connectedness than
other people, and second, they claim co-conscious introspective access to a
single mind. Psychological connectedness of alternate personalities holds
within normal range, but the multiple herself is prone to rapid and dramatic
transitions in posture, vocal pattern and affective and emotional saliency.
Switching normally results in contrasting perceived social roles, changes in
age and gender identity and corresponding shifts in assessed social status and
appropriate forms of social interaction. Most alters are rather conventional
personality types, stereotypically enacted and drawn from culturally available
prototypes. Recognizable personalities recur, who name themselves as separate
persons and claim self-referential ownership of their actions, experiences and
memories. Certain stimuli elicit specific personality profiles: A multiple
might switch to a child alter at the toy store in the mall and shift to an
aggressive alter when mugged in the parking lot.
Co-consciousness
challenges most directly the foundation of the traditional concept of a person.
If different persons can share a single consciousness then the Lockean equation
between sameness of consciousness and personal identity collapses. Behavior
patterns alone cannot establish so strong a conclusion if, as many philosophers
believe, dispositional properties are adjectival on individuals.
Only if there is reason to think that alters sustain a stream of psychological
connectedness independently of executive control of the body can the language
of multiplicity be uncontroversially interpreted as more than a metaphorical
description of rather strange behavior. Many alters do claim simultaneous
awareness of the subjective states of the regnant alter, often in the form of
an interior dialogue between observer and participant selves concerning outward
behavior. Typically the lines of introspective access are asymmetrical. The
presenting personality may need to be introduced to the many selves she hosted
over the years; other alters may be privy to the thoughts of some but not all
of their confederates; and sometimes one alter plays the role of author
omniscient, holding back herself but keeping track of everyone else. Some
alters even claim a life history all their own, complete with details of
illicit love affairs and grand accomplishments plainly at odds with the
objective biography of the multiple.
II
Autobiographical memory is the
cognitive system through which persons gain access to their pasts and construct
a sense of who they are.
Episodic memories of specific experiences are nested within a hierarchical
structure that includes general event memory as point of entry and lifetime
period memory at the most abstract level. Lifetime period memory is the
person’s knowledge of her social and bodily identity together with a skeletal
structure of memories of blocks of time and turning points in her past, and
memories of settled intentions, plans and projects for the future. The key
point regarding lifetime period memory for understanding multiple personality
is that non-multiples cross index alternative overlapping sequences of lifetime
periods. For example, I cross classify the eighties as the lifetime period when
I was a graduate student, as the lifetime period when I lived with Nancy, and
as the years of my father’s heart disease and death. I access different
schemata for different recollective purposes, cross checking for accuracy and
meaning.
Episodic memory of one’s personal past
is dynamically constructed on line within this larger meaning-conferring
structure. The retrospective reconstruction of the past comes to the forefront
in times of crisis, when the events of a lifetime demand wholesale
reinterpretation. A woman discovers the habitual philandering of her husband
and what was once remembered as innocent banter between her mate and a female
friend now is recalled as infidelity and betrayal; an adolescent learns of his
parents long planned divorce and comes to remember family holidays, vacations
and birthdays as forced exercises in pretended civility; a father struggling to
come to terms with the tragic death of child remembers their last conversation
quite differently before and after he hears the news.
The content of episodic memory also
depends upon the format in which events are recalled. Most people can recall an
experience either as an observer, from a third person point of view, looking
down on one’s self as events unfold; or as a participant, from a field or first
person point of view, seeing things as they looked when it happened.
Recent events tend to be recalled in a field format; more remote experiences in
an observer format, although most people can shift back and forth effortlessly.
How one formats episodic memories alters their emotional saliency and their
retrieval pathways to other episodic memories. If, for example, you remember
the last wedding you attended from a field perspective, you are more likely to
feel empathy for the bride and groom and to recall perceptual details of the
pew in which you sat. An observer formatted version would have a more
objective, camcorder quality.
One of the most well established
results in the science of memory is the Cue Specificity Principle: Some aspect
of the state of mind of the person experiencing an event encodes an access
pathway to the right engrams in long term memory.
Recollection occurs when a retrieval environment reinstates the encoding cue.
The cue could be sensory or perceptual: a long forgotten face evokes fond
recollections of an old friend; the smell of Grandma’s cookies releases a
memory movie of childhood Thanksgivings; Proust’s taste of Madeleine calls
forth rembrance of things past. Or the cue could be affective, or
pharmacological, or semantic. People who are depressed remember sad times;
alcoholics can’t remember where they put that bottle until they’ve had a drink
or two; a memory may remain on the tip of the tongue until just the right word
is spoken. All episodic memories are state dependent in the sense that
something in the retrieval environment, either an external stimulus or an inner
state, must activate the reconstruction of the engram. Shallowly encoded
episodic memories may lay dormant for years awaiting just the right retrieval
cue. Elaborative encoding, in contrast, lays down a broad range of access cues
by which episodic memories can be recalled faithfully, clearly and reliably.
The phenomenological record stored in
long term memory is fragmentary under the best of retrieval conditions. People
extrapolate a plausible rendition of the experience from the accessible
engrams, cross checked episodic memories, objective sources and the larger
structure of autobiographical memory. People who have suffered frontal lobe and
hippocampal trauma must cope with a radically incomplete phenomenological record.
They tend to confabulate at all levels of autobiographical memory, to fill in
the gaping holes in memory with imaginary details believed to be true. One
patient relates on successive occasions barely recognizable accounts of the
accident that caused his neurological trauma; another remembers general events
inconsistently, first claiming to be an expert golfer, then disclaiming much
experience with the game. A stroke victim recounts a family history out of
kilter with reality, insisting in the presence of his wife of thirty years that
he is a newly wed. When shown old wedding pictures, he says the groom is his
brother who looks a lot like he did years ago; when presented with his grown
children, he replies with a sly grin, that you don’t have to be married to have
kids. There’s a thin line between extrapolation and confabulation, a line most
us cross on occasion and but which for others becomes an habitual form of
coping.
General
event memories are thematic composites of repeated activities or extended events
indexed by lifetime periods. All those driveways shoveled merge into a mass of
cold and white and aching backs; hundreds of hours of assembly line tedium
collapse into an amorphous image of factory work space and unbearable boredom;
countless failed attempts to explain the ontological argument congeal into a
composite class picture of blank incomprehension. General event memory, like
lifetime period memory, provides flexible access to personal memories by
cross-classifying types of experience. Inferential access to general event
memories of dinner dates under the headings, “having a bit too much to drink,”
“making clever remarks” and “trouble with relationships” might lead to more
adaptive behavior in the future. General event memories are usually more
reliable than episodic memories, but still are susceptible to error due to
state dependent retrieval, confabulation, self-serving reconstruction and
selective amnesia.
III
The thesis of this essay is that one
can avoid reification of alters if multiple personality is reinterpreted as a
failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the
normal case, alternative autobiographical memory schemata cross classify a
human life, and in so doing provide access to a variety of interpretative
frameworks with their associated clusters of general event memory and episodic
memory. Densely interconnected autobiographical schemata help people make sense
of experience and respond appropriately to their social and natural
environment. Multiples exhibit erratic and sometimes bizarre behavior because
they cannot access reliably the intersecting autobiographical memory schemata
which permit graceful transitions between social roles, behavioral repertoire
and emotional dispositions.
The language of multiplicity should be
understood as a therapeutic device, or as a literary or cinematic metaphor.
“Switching” can be viewed as state dependent autobiographical memory. Given the
right cues or stressors, a multiple gains access to one autobiographical memory
schemata, and loses access to another. When a multiple dissociates, she does
not literally “leave” the scene of the trauma, or “hand off” the experience to
another substantial self. Multiples do not normally go limp or become catatonic
in response to stress. They cope as best they can, but they shallowly encode
both the episodic memory of abuse and the form of behavior that gets them
through it. Repeated episodes of abuse are shallowly encoded as general event
memories of social interactions believed to be adaptive. Perhaps a repertoire
of flirtatious or jocular behaviors work well for repeated incidents of sexual
abuse; angry and aggressive responses might deflect effectively physical abuse;
introverted or passive behavior may be the best way a child can deal with the
emotional double bind created by an abusive caregiver.
An alter “comes out” when the internal
or external retrieval environment cues recollection of a set of general event
memories and their associated behavioral repertoire. The multiple then
reconstructs episodic memories in an emotionally acceptable form, confabulates
the scaffolding of lifetime period memory necessary to make sense of her
recollections, and updates the schemata as accessible experience accumulates.
Multiples construct alternative autobiographical memory schemata just as
normally integrated people do, but with little or no cross indexing or cross
checking, they have no effective barrier to the proliferation of confabulated
life stories.
“Alters” can be understood as shallowly
encoded state dependent autobiographical memory schemata. The very act of
naming alters encourages the multiple to reconstruct her autobiographical
memory schemata as the life histories of distinct individuals. Skepticism is in
order regarding the reality of alters because they can be treated as
independent persons only after a conceptual framework is in place within which
they can be recognized, but the language of multiplicity simply was not
available in the childhoods of many of today’s multiples.
Of course objects can exist before they are recognized. Bacteria made people
sick before there were microscopes or microbiology. If alters turn out to be
the only plausible explanation for reports of co-consciousness, then cases of
multiple personality begin to look like cases of multiple persons.
The public evidence in favor of
co-consciousness takes two principal forms, neither of which provide much
reason to reject of the unity of consciousness. Some multiples exhibit behavior
which can be interpreted as “waverings” between two or more alters. Jennifer
Radden reports a case of a multiple on a trip to the grocery store.
She fills her cart with sensible adult staples, suddenly stops, turns and adds
several boxes of brightly colored children’s cereals. Her behavior could be
understood as a co-conscious Child Alter begging for and getting her way, but
the incident could be interpreted just as easily as a normal adult acting on a
self-indulgent impulse. What is most surprising about this and other cases of
purported wavering is how weakly they suggest co-consciousness. One would
expect nearly constant battles for control among strong willed co-conscious
alters, many of whom are supposed to despise one another.
The second form of public evidence for
co-consciousness fares no better. Multiples sometimes claim to know of events
that happened when another alter was in control of the body. While more common
than wavering, this kind of evidence also is open to a rather obvious alternative
explanation. A multiple might claim to have watched her Good Daughter Alter
open Christmas presents, silently waiting for her chance to come out and throw
that horrid dress in her mother’s face. Such claims to have co-consciously
watched events unfold are memory reports, susceptible to all of the
reconstructive influences of normal episodic memory and occurring within a
confabulatory autobiographical memory system.
I am not suggesting that reports of
co-consciousness be dismissed as entirely delusional. Multiples may be making
introspective reports about a genuine phenomenon, just not the phenomenon of
co-consciousness. Recall that episodic memories may be recollected in either an
observer or a field format, and that how one remembers affects the emotional
saliency of the memory and its retrieval pathway potential. A multiple who
entertained simultaneous observer and field memories would have both a first
person and a third person recollective experience of the same event. It would
seem to her that she participated in an experience and observed the experience
at the same time. She remembers opening the present and feeling gratitude, and
she remembers seeing herself opening the present and feeling disgust, and since
her memory schemata are disconnected, she experiences both simultaneously. With
the helpful prompting of therapists, fellow multiples and multobiographers, she
retroactively describes her recollective experience as co-consciousness.
We
may conclude that neither of the philosophically interesting aspects of
multiple personality warrants a realist interpretation of the language of
multiplicity. The diminished psychological connectedness multiples display can
be explained as state dependent autobiographical memory. Putative reports of
co-consciousness can be understood as reports from a unified consciousness of
the experience of simultaneously entertaining a subjective and an objective
point of view. Multiple personality, it turns out, cannot bear the weight some
philosophers put upon it.
IV
Carol Rovane’s revisionary metaphysics
substitutes the rational unity of deliberation for the phenomenological unity
of consciousness as both necessary and sufficient for personal identity. The
deliberative standpoint imposes unity upon intentional episodes through a
commitment to the use of practical reason to arrive at all things considered
judgments about what it would be best to think and do. Certain overriding
goals, what Rovane calls unifying projects, fix the contours of deliberation within
a larger normative structure that confers meaning and coherence upon the whole.
The rational unity of deliberation is thoroughgoingly normative in the sense
that nothing in the contingent character of the human person imposes a
metaphysical limit upon the scope of personhood. In contrast, the faculty of
introspective awareness that circumscribes the limits of phenomenological unity
may or may not be rooted in the psychological constitution of the human mind.
This result implies two philosophical test implications for her theory of
personal identity. Human beings who share a commitment to a collective unifying
project, and adopt the deliberative stance on its behalf, constitute a group
person whom other persons should regard as a person in its own right.
Similarly, according to Rovane, unifying projects may lay claim to less than
the resources of a single human life, both over time and at a time. In such a
case, human sized rational deliberators would be obliged to recognize multiple
persons within a single human being.
Rovane does not rest her case for
multiple persons upon multobiographies, but she does cite Sybil as the
empirical foundation for “two features of multiple personality disorder [which]
suggest alters would be multiple persons within a single human being.”
The reality of “alter personalities who approximate, and may even meet, the
condition of being multiple persons within a single human being” demonstrates
for Rovane the logical possibility of multiple persons.
First, Rovane tells us that multiples
exhibit behavior that invites others to engage each alternate personality as if
it were a separate person. Indeed, multiples may be so firmly convinced of the
independent existence of their alternate personalities that effective therapy,
not to mention good manners, mandates relating to each personality in a way
approximating normal social interaction. This is true, but entirely consistent
with an unspoken attitude of active disbelief in the reality of multiple persons.
After all, people have personified just about everything. Some people treat
their pets as if they were persons; other people earnestly believe the forces
of nature are godlike persons and wholeheartedly embrace them as friends,
allies and enemies. One contemporary philosopher even attempted to form an
I-Thou relationship with a rock.
Moreover, people diagnosed with Multiple Personality Disorder exhibit symptoms
of clinical disorientation, confusion, depression and amnesia that together imply
that the fixation of belief in these subjects fails to reliably track reality.
The outward behavior of a multiple, it would seem, provides no more reason to
believe that she hosts separate persons than the outward behavior of a
delusional personality warrants believing that he is Napoleon.
Second, the co-consciousness claimed by
many multiples provides Rovane with a clear counterexample to the classical
Lockean theory of the phenomenal unity of persons. If more than one person can
enjoy introspective access to the contents of a single consciousness, then
phenomenal unity cannot by itself constitute personal identity. These
co-conscious agents acquire the status of being persons, according to Rovane,
because each deliberates from the standpoint of a commitment to the overall
rational unity demanded by a unifying project. The counterexample evaporates if
the apparent co-consciousness of multiple personality arises from a failure by
a single person to integrate his or her autobiographical schemata. Only if one
takes the reports of multiples at face value does the empirical data imply
co-consciousness. At this point Rovane shifts her attention to an idealized
description of multiple persons who enjoy unobstructed access to one another’s
mental states.
Imagine first three sisters who wish to
use to the limited resources of their family to pursue separate life plans.
They might arrive at a compromise solution in which each followed the
activities of the others while they took turns using the car, the house and the
family budget. The sisters would have much in common but no one would question
their separate identities. Now imagine a single human being who wished to
pursue simultaneously three independent careers, one as a teacher, another as a
philosopher, and a third as a concert pianist. Assume that each fractional life
plan has sufficient coherence to constitute a unifying project and that the
human being is committed to achieving overall rational unity within each sphere
of life. The teacher, the philosopher and the musician might negotiate a
mutually satisfactory time sharing agreement in which each would be a
co-conscious but silent and indifferent participant in the mental life favored
by the others. If such an arrangement worked well, why question their separate
identities?
The human being in Rovane’s imagined
case suffers none of the amnesic barriers or other failures of autobiographical
memory that generate serious pathology in real cases of multiple personality.
Since they participate equally in a single phenomenal unity of consciousness,
anything one experiences, all three experience. Rovane’s idealized multiple
persons not only know what each other knows, they feel what each other feels.
When the concert pianist gives a performance, the teacher and the philosopher
are right up there on stage, taking their bows, conscious of every intention to
strike a key, every expressive intonation, every creative interpretation of the
score, every lapse in technique. Similarly, the pianist is fully aware of the
teacher’s success or failure in the classroom, experiencing along with her both
the satisfaction of conveying a difficult thought to a bright student and the
embarrassment of a joke that falls flat. When the philosopher hits upon an unnoticed
solution to the mind-body problem and publishes her results to rave reviews,
the teacher and the musician feel the same rush of satisfaction and pride as
the philosopher.
If they are to remain distinct persons
in Rovane’s sense none of these shared experiences can enter into one another’s
rational points of view. In the absence of amnesic barriers, multiple persons
would need to act as border guards of their deliberative standpoints, ever
vigilant lest some cognitive or affective leakage threaten their identity. The
philosopher must not daydream about the musician’s upcoming date to perform
Beethoven’s Appassionata at Carnegie Hall or allow the experience of the
desire to practice the piano to influence her all things considered judgment to
catch up on the latest philosophy journals. Similarly, the teacher cannot
permit her experience of the philosopher’s intellectual excitement to influence
her all things considered judgment about what to include in her afternoon
lecture. Even though their awareness of one another’s thoughts is linked
normally to their shared hedonic centers, they must somehow steeply discount
the motivational impact of two thirds of their experience. Only in this way can
they preserve the overall rational unity that for Rovane constitutes their
personal identity.
I hope it is clear that the multiple
persons Rovane imagines, if they manage to maintain their separate identities
at all, are engaged in an inherently unstable and thoroughly pointless
enterprise. Actual multiples are able to maintain the illusion of distinct
identities only because their disordered awareness blocks simultaneous access
to the unity of phenomenal consciousness. Rovane is thus faced with a dilemma:
If multiple persons suffer the failures of autobiographical memory
characteristic of real cases of multiple personality, then there is no
compelling reason to postulate independently existing alters. The phenomena of
multiplicity can be explained more economically, and with at least as much
plausibility, as a failure of autobiographical memory. But if multiple persons
enjoy full introspective access to the experiences of their alters, then their
rational points of view will tend to merge as each takes into account the
subjective experience of the others. Either way, multiple personality fails to
challenge the presumption of the unity of consciousness at the foundation of
the concept of a person.
The clinical goal of integration for
human beings with Multiple Personality Disorder reinforces this conclusion. If,
as Rovane claims, “Sybil’s alter personalities satisfied the ethical criterion
of personhood,” then the ethical implications of a fusion of these persons
within a single integrated human being must be faced.
Some therapists seem to embrace these implications. Irving Yalom writes that
“therapeutic monogamy” required a “cannibalistic” attitude toward alters: “I
chose to stand by Marge. I would sacrifice her rival to her, pluck her
feathers, pull her asunder, and bit by bit, feed her to Marge.”
It is not clear that Yalom uses the language of multiplicity literally, but it
is clear that Rovane and many other philosophers are committed to a realist
interpretation. Why shouldn’t therapists view reintegration as many alters do,
as equivalent to the death of a person? And, if they do, can they in good
conscience participate in the moral equivalent of homicide?
Rovane claims that her view does not
cast an ethical shadow over the clinical goal of integration of personalities.
She suggests that alters may be convinced to share the goal of integration if
they conclude from their own rational point of view that integration matters
more than their own unifying projects. If so, it is not necessarily irrational
for these alters to participate in the goal of integration. But what of the
role of the therapist? If one of her other patients came to the conclusion that
he should destroy himself because doing so served some higher purpose, should
the therapist enable this choice? If one interprets the language of multiplicity
literally, what is the difference?
Or suppose that one or more multiple
persons refuse to go along with integration. Rovane suggests that “a familiar
form of paternalism” would justify therapists “pursing the goal of reintegrating
the personalities.”
It is not clear which form of paternalism Professor Rovane has in mind, and she
does not pursue the point. Normally, paternalistic interventions justify
overriding the express preference of a person because doing so would be in their
own best interests. It is difficult to see how integration benefits a multiple
person eliminated against his or her will. The only form of paternalism of this
kind with which I am familiar is active involuntary euthanasia, and such a
practice, though in some sense familiar, casts a long ethical shadow over the
practice of medicine. I do not wish to interpret Professor Rovane uncharitably,
but how else can we understand this paternalism? If there is no other
interpretation, and if she insists upon a literal reading of the language of
multiplicity, then her metaphysical thesis does undermine the clinical goal of
integration. If, on the other hand, she interprets multiplicity metaphorically
in the context of clinical practice, then she has abandoned the ontological
thesis of multiple persons at the heart of her theory of personal identity.
Either way, her revisionary metaphysic stands in need of revision.
As a philosopher, I do not presume to
make judgments about sound clinical practice. I only note that the autobiographical
memory interpretation of multiple personality is congruent with clinical
practice as described by the standard textbook in the field, Frank Putnam’s Diagnosis
and Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder. Putnam writes that therapy
should make available to “the entire system of personalities the knowledge and
secrets held by specific alter personalities” so that the patient can achieve
“a new and more integrated sense of personal identity.”
A multiple who in therapy came to elaboratively encode alternative
autobiographical memory schemata, discarding confabulated memories along with
associated inappropriate affect and behavior could be seen as making progress
toward the goal of a single transparent self.
D. Dennett and N.
Humphrey, “Speaking for our selves,” in D. Dennett, Brainchildren
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). Owen Flanagan develops an alternative
narrative self account of multiple personality disorder in O. Flanagan,
“Multiple identity, character transformation, and self-reclamation,” in G.
Graham and Lynn Stephens, eds., Philosophical Psychopathology
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).
S. Braude, First
Person Plural (London: Rowan & Littlefield, 1995), esp. pp.
170-180.
J. Radden, Divided
Minds and Successive Selves (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1996), esp. pp. 37-59.
S. Hurley, Perception
and Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), esp.
pp. 121-129.
C. Rovane, The Bounds
of Agency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), esp. pp.
169-179.
F. Schreiber, Sybil
(New York: Warner Books, 1973).
For a defense of the
adjectival status of dispositional properties see, S. Shoemaker, “Introspection
and the self,” in P. French et al., eds., Studies in the Philosophy of Mind,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1986).
M. Conway, “A
structural model of autobiographical memory,” in M. Conway et al., eds., Theoretical
Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory (Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992).
D. Schacter, Searching
for Memory (New York: Basic Books, 1996), pp. 18-23.
E. Tulving, Elements
of Episodic Memory (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1983).
A. Baddeley and B.
Wilson, “Amnesia, autobiographical memory and confabulation,” in D. Rubin, ed.,
Autobiographical Memory (New York: Cambridge University
Press,1986).
I. Hacking, Rewriting
the Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1995).
K. Warren, “The power
and the promise of ecological feminism,” Environmental Ethics 12 (Summer
1990).
I. Yalom, Love’s
Executioner, and other Tales of Psychotherapy
(New York: Basic Books,1989).
F. Putnam, Diagnosis
and Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder
(New York: Guilford Press, 1989), pp. 115 and 316.